불황이 지속되면서 연금 수령액을 낮추는 방안이 등장

연금시장 2018. 11. 28. 01:17

주식시장이 좋지않고 저금리도 지속되고 있는 상태에서 네델란드의 4개 대형 연기금의 재정적립수준(funding levels)가 악화되고 있습니다.
결국 연금 수령액을 낮추는 방안을 꺼내들 것 같습니다.
금속산업의 연기금인 PMT와 PME의 경우 적립비율이 3%p 낮아져서 가까스로 101% 정도에 머무를 것으로 예상되자 2020년에는 급여삭감을 할것을 시사하고 있습니다.

지난 10월 MSCI World index가 6.7% 떨어지고 30년 swap rate가 거의 3bp 빠져서 1.5%가 된 상태입니다. 이렇게 금리가 낮아지면 연금부채는 눈덩이처럼 불어나는 거지요.

물론 작년부터 가입자들과 계속 협상을 지속하고 있는데, 10년간 무조건적이고 불가역적인 형태로 삭감할 모양입니다.

공무원 연금인 ABP도 연기금 자산은 2.8% 감소한 반면 연금부채는 0.1% 올라서 재정상태가 법정최소적립비율인 105%를 간신히 넘기고 있네요. 결국 연금급여삭감 카드가 등장할 듯 싶습니다.

출처 : https://retirementincomejournal.com/article/dutch-pensions-face-possible-benefit-cuts/?fbclid=IwAR1ez25y1e2oL5-QDqgakyct0t1F-UKFP9oUfU-edPfg2uCGAdcBp_aI8_g

November 22, 2018

Dutch pensions face possible benefit cuts

The MSCI World index declined by 6.7% during October and the 30-year swap rate dropped almost three basis points, to 1.5%. Interest rates are crucial for discounting future pension liabilities.

Falling equity markets and lower interest rates hurt the funding levels of the four largest Dutch pension funds in October, prompting them to contemplate benefits cuts to participants, IPE.com reported.

Two metal industry pensions, PMT and PME, drew closer to imposing benefit cuts in 2020 after figures published last week showed that their funding ratios had declined three percentage points, to about 101%.

PME said it had already been communicating to members the risk of cuts through all its information channels during the past year. “We are trying to find a balance between warning and unnecessarily worrying our participants,” it said. Cuts can be spread out over a 10-year period, but they are unconditional and cannot be reversed.

The MSCI World index declined by 6.7% during October and the 30-year swap rate dropped almost three basis points, to 1.5%. Interest rates are crucial for discounting future pension liabilities.

Civil service pension ABP saw the value of its assets drop 2.8% to €407bn, while its liabilities rose 0.1% to €399bn. To avoid benefit cuts, its funding ratio must rebound to the required minimum of about 105% by year-end. Benefit cuts must be applied when a plan has been underfunded for five consecutive years.

To PMT and PME, their funding at the end of 2019 will be crucial to avoid cuts. At the end of October, their coverage ratios stood at 102.5% and 101.7%, respectively, compared to the required 104.3%.

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장수리스크를 극복하고 연금 많이 받는법

연금시장 2018. 11. 25. 23:03

확정기여(DC)형의 근로자가 퇴직했을때 더 두둑하게 연금을 챙겨갈 방안은 무엇일까요?

잘 적립하는것 이외에 적립해 놓은 것을 잘 빼서 쓰는겁니다. 너무 많이 빨리 꺼내써서 곳간이 비었는데도 살아있다면 그냥 빈곤한 노인이 되는 겁니다. 반면에 조금씩 빼서 아껴서 썼는데 단명하면?

상속인들은 행복할 겁니다. 이걸 소위 퇴직자의 장수리스크입니다.

DB는 없고 DC만 있는 호주에서 장수리스크를 최소화하기 위한 상품 다양화가 시도되고 있습니다.

 

출처 : https://cuffelinks.com.au/collective-income-schemes-deal-longevity/?fbclid=IwAR3Fb9PaDcPRkvt6RHhjsozfdh68i8fnT505ltFWe0NyyqkVhyVlqoMSmbg

 

Schemes designed to deal with longevity risk

Australia’s large super funds are building better products to provide income in retirement for their members. In part, this reflects policy initiatives such as innovative income streams, but some funds are actively considering their retirement offer ahead of the potential requirement to offer each member a CIPR (Comprehensive Income Product for Retirement).

The key element of a CIPR is to manage longevity risk. This can’t be done if the only option is an account-based pension (ABP), which the majority of superannuation pensions are currently based on. While a partial investment in an annuity can provide the longevity risk management, there are other options for funds to use a collective income stream alongside the ABP.

What exactly is a collective income stream?

In short, a collective income scheme is one in which:

  • members have no individual account (i.e. ownership of capital) in the scheme.
  • the liability of the employer sponsor(s) to contribute is both certain and limited.
  • there is a retirement income target, but no concrete promise (this of course could be made more secure (e.g. by derivatives) or guaranteed by a third party, but without recourse to the sponsors).
  • longevity risk is spread across the pool.
  • investment risk is spread across the pool.

These schemes are sometimes called ‘group self-annuitisation schemes’ (or GSAs) but the definitions have blurred since GSAs were first described by some Australian academics. There are key differences between the various collective schemes in their degree of flexibility and the approach to managing retiree risks. These factors include:

Flexibility Risk Management
– Entry point (pre/post retirement)
– Choice and ability to change
– Access to capital
– Payment of residual capital (estate)
– Timing of contributions
– Timing of payments
– Mortality pooling
– Market risk protections
– Diversification (asset allocation)
– Guarantees and capital protection
– Inflation protection

There are three key benefits from using a GSA (or other collective income schemes):

1. Pooling idiosyncratic longevity risk

There are two forms of longevity risk. One risk is related to how long everyone will live, and will change with medical improvements and lifestyle changes etc. (systematic longevity risk). The other risk is that some people will live considerably longer than the average (idiosyncratic longevity risk).

GSAs pool idiosyncratic longevity risk. Pools of retirees (in the same age cohort) tend to have a more reliable distribution of ages at death, particularly as the pool becomes larger. When planning for 10,000 retirees, the law of large numbers will start to see quite a predictable distribution of lifespans around the mean and hence the risk is effectively diversified away.

Because it has no resources beyond what is in the pool, a GSA arrangement is still exposed to systematic longevity risk. This form of risk, if it unfolds, will be borne directly by the GSA-funded retiree in the form of a reduced income.

2. Mortality credits

A mortality credit is the higher payment that is available to someone who contributes their capital to a longevity pool, where participants are only entitled to payments while they are alive. Those who live beyond the actuarial life expectancy of the pool benefit from the contributions of those who die earlier.

Leading annuity expert, Moshe A. Milevsky (2006), describes it as a process where the capital and interest of the deceased member is ‘lost’ to that person and their beneficiaries. It is then ‘gained’ by the surviving members of the pool. The remaining value of the notional capital of the deceased is spread across all members to help support their lifetime income payments.

As the life expectancy is an average, approximately half of the members of the pool will die before reaching the expected average and will not benefit further. The remaining value of their notional capital is then available to support the remaining liabilities in the pool. These mortality credits are distributed ex-ante by the scheme in setting its targeted payment rates. In other words, mortality credits enable the income paid to the member to be higher than the combined total of the partial return of capital and projected asset returns of the scheme comprised in each payment.

Mortality credits provide a form of return not directly linked to the capital markets.

3. Reduced (or no) capital costs

Pooling of longevity risk (both idiosyncratic and systematic) is available through a lifetime annuity offered by a life insurance company. These products also remove the market risks from the retiree and pay a guaranteed income. In order to secure these payments, the shareholders of the life insurance company provide capital as a buffer to protect the retiree. This capital is at risk to the shareholders and needs a sufficient return. The guaranteed payments to the annuitant are set so that what remains from the returns on the total asset pool provides the expected return to shareholders. If these expectations turn out to be wrong, the losses are borne by the shareholders, who, in the worst case, would be called on to provide even more capital under powers given to APRA in 2012.

The logic for GSAs is that by not using capital buffers or guarantees, they will be able to avoid the cost of the capital or the insurance afforded by the guarantee and thereby increase the retirement income able to be distributed to members. The flip side of this argument is that a guarantee has a value in the defensive or ‘safety-first’ part of the portfolio and not having a guarantee is a weakness, rather than a strength.

The development of better retirement outcomes for Australians is likely to see growing use of GSAs and other collective income streams. This will require solutions to some of the more technical aspects, such as operating a GSA over risky assets with a need for surplus/deficit management or highly volatile income streams.

There is also a regulatory concern over the disclosure of the GSA target. Without a guarantee, there can be no real promise of income in retirement. How will retirees be able to distinguish between alternative structures that might target different incomes from the same asset mix? At least with a guaranteed product, the income can be relied on. The additional capital backing the promise provides this security for the retiree.

There is no magic pudding in retirement. A GSA scheme can share investment risk between one member or generation of retirees and another, but it can’t reduce it overall. If one GSA member takes less investment risk, another member is taking more. Pooling does reduce the idiosyncratic mortality risk, but as with idiosyncratic market risk under the capital asset pricing model, this is an unrewarded risk. Removing it alone does not increase total returns to the pool.

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감독원, DB도입 기업에게 주주배당보다 퇴직연금 적립에 주력하라고 경고

연금시장 2018. 11. 12. 01:50

"확정급여형 제도를 도입한 기업은 주주들에게 높은 배당을 주기 전에  연기금의 적립부족을 빠른 기간 안에 해소해야 한다"고 영국 연금감독원의 Anthony Raymond 수석 감독정책담당자가 이야기 했습니다.

기업은 자신의 고유자산과 연기금을 통합해서 운용하는데, 주주에게 주는 배당금은 커지는데, 연기금 적립부족을 해소하기 위해서 납입하는 퇴직연금 부담금은 그만큼 커지지 않아서 차이가 점점 벌어지는 것을 경고한 것입니다.

물론 이 차이를 측정하는 것은 연금부채를 평가하는 할인율이고 이 할인율은 고유자산과 연기금을 통합해서 운용하는 기업이 선택하는 거죠.

최근 기업들이 연기금의 부담금 책정에는 인색하면서도 주주에게는 넉넉하게 배당을 챙겨주는 통에 재정안정화계획서에 적립부족해소 계획이 실패하는 경향이 있다고 하네요.  

 

출처: http://www.pionline.com/article/20180405/ONLINE/180409915/companies-should-fund-pension-plans-not-pay-big-dividends-pensions-regulator-says

 

Companies should fund pension plans, not pay big dividends, Pensions Regulator says

 

Large plan sponsors should commit to reducing defined benefit fund deficits over a shorter period of time instead of paying out high dividends to shareholders, the U.K. pensions regulator said in its annual funding statement Thursday.

The Pensions Regulator said it was concerned about the increasing gap between dividend payments and deficit-reduction payments, and called on plan sponsors to reconsider the choice of valuation methods and investment strategies to counter these deficits.

"The discount rate should be chosen using integrated risk management principles that are consistent with their long-term funding and investment targets and the view of the employer covenant," the TPR statement said.

 

In addition, the regulator warned that intragroup loans and transfers of business assets at less than fair value were as detrimental as dividend payments.

"In our 2018 (report) we are being clearer about our expectations of how trustees should approach their plan valuations. Recent corporate failures have shown the risks of long recovery plans while payments to shareholders are excessive, relative to deficit-repair contributions," Anthony Raymond, interim executive director of regulatory policy at the TPR, said in a news release.

"Trustees should negotiate robustly with the sponsoring employer to secure a fair deal for the pension plan, while employers should balance the interests of participants with returns to shareholders and investors," Mr. Raymond said in the release. "We are working more closely than ever with trustees to support them in this process. However, if trustees fail to act we can intervene to protect participants by using the full range of powers available to us now."

The TPR also asked plan sponsors and trustees to focus on risk management and contingency planning in the context of persisting economic uncertainty.

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퇴직연금 가입자교육의 중요성

연금시장 2018. 11. 3. 00:35

미국 와튼스쿨의 연금연구소( the Pension Research Council)가 발표한 “Assessing the Impact of Financial Education Programs: A Quantitative Model"의 연구결과에 의하면 꾸준히 금융교육을 받은 40대의 경우 은퇴시점에 퇴직연금자산이 10% 이상 증가한다고 합니다. 반면에 일회성 교육을 받은 경우는 단기적으로는 효과가 있어도 장기적으로는 의미가 없다고 합니다.

연구소는 가입자교육의 성과를 측정하고자 재산, 재무지식, 주식투자여부 등을 가지고 패널자료를 만들어 분석하였습니다. 가입자교육에 가장 관심이 많은 연령층은 40~60대 층이었고, 고등교육을 받은 사람일 수록 참여도가 높았습니다.

그러나 교육에 불참하는 사람은 가난하고 금융지식이 부족한 사람으로 분석되었습니다.

 교육의 대상과 방법이 맞춤식으로 가야한다는 것을 시사하는 것같습니다.

 

 

출처 : https://www.plansponsor.com/continuous-financial-education-improves-retirement-outcomes/

Continuous Financial Education Improves Retirement Outcomes

A research report says "financial education delivered to employees around the age of 40 will optimally enhance savings at retirement close to 10%. By contrast, programs that provide one-time education can generate short-term but few long-term effects.”

By Lee Barney

However, the council says that people between the ages of 40 and 60 are the most likely to participate in workplace financial wellness programs, since this is when they tend to save the most in their working lives.

“Furthermore, we find that program participation is higher for the better-educated, due to the larger gain in investing in knowledge for these individuals,” the council says. “Conversely, the least educated are less likely to partake of the program offering. The uneducated optimally save less, both as a result of their greater reliance on the social safety net, and their shorter life expectancies.” Additionally, higher-cost financial wellness programs have lower participation rates.

The council found that those who participate in a financial wellness program “have higher earnings, more initial knowledge and more wealth, while nonparticipants are poorer, earn less and have little financial knowledge at baseline. This occurs regardless of the age at which the program is offered.”

The council says it is important to offer financial wellness programs consistently: “After the program expires, we see that those who participate in the program cut back on their investment. Along with the depreciation in financial knowledge, this leads to a dampening of the program’s effect when it is offered. After the initial ramp-up in financial knowledge, the marginal effect on behavior is quite small. The net effect of a one-year program offered at age 30 is quite small, particularly by the time the worker attains age 65. In other words, a one-time financial education program may have little effect, as expected, but the long-term effects of a persistent financial education program can be quite sizable.”

The full report can be downloaded here.



출처: http://cantan.tistory.com/entry/퇴직연금-가입자교육의-중요성?category=810200 [High Thinking, Simple Living]

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생애주기이론의 기원과 현황

연금시장 2018. 10. 20. 16:37

연금쪽에서 일하시다보면 낯익은 분들이 많이 생기게 되는데, 연기금 투자 관련해서 꼭 등장하시는 분이 보스턴대학 Bodie교수님입니다.

유트브에서 라이프사이클 이론(요즘은 초등학생도 아는 생애주기이론)의 기원과 현황을 얘기하는데...
어빙 피셔, 프리드먼, 모딜리아니, 머튼...그리고 자기!

연금관련 수많은 논문을 썼던 분이기에 달변가인줄로 알았는데, TDF 머튼과는 대조적이네요

 

 

https://youtu.be/U59i8d8kA6k

<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/U59i8d8kA6k" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen></iframe>

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국민연금, 기다렸다 늦게 받으면 얼마나 더 받을까요

연금시장 2018. 10. 7. 23:40

미국의 경우 국민연금 수급권이 있는 사람은 만 62세부터 70세까지 기간중에서 연금수령시기를 선택할수 있습니다. 잘 아시다시피 더 늙어서 받으면 일찍 받기 시작한 경우보다 더 많이 받겠죠. 기다렸다가 67세 받기시작하면 62세에 시작한 것과 비교해서 43%를 더 받고 70세까지 기다리면 75%를 더 받는다고 합니다.
그런데 연금재정은 현상태로 정부가 추가조치없이 내버려두면 2030년쯤에 바닥난다고들 합니다.

자! 적은 돈이지만 조금이라도 안정적일 때 빨리 받을까요, 위험하지만 참고 기다렸다 큰 돈으로 받을까요?

미국 와튼스쿨 은퇴연구소(Wharton’s Pension Research Council)의 팟캐스트로 그 이야기를 들어보세요

요즘 미국인들은 은퇴할때 20~30년 전보다 은퇴자들보다 더 빚이 많아졌답니다. 주택담보대출, 신용카드 빚, 각종 자질구레한 대출금들로 은퇴하는 시점에 값아야할 돈이 너무 많고, 그래서 연금 수령대신에 일시불로 받아갈 수밖에 없다네요.

남자보다 여자가 더 일찍 찾아쓰니 여자가 더 빈곤해지고 있구요.

음...미국이야기입니다!

출처 : http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/delay-social-security/

 

 

Is Social Security Really Running Short?

 

mic Listen to the podcast:

Wharton's Olivia Mitchell discusses her research on how to convince people to delay claiming Social Security benefits.

 

Many Americans claim Social Security benefits perhaps earlier than they should. Under current rules, eligible individuals can claim retirement benefits at age 62, or they can wait until as long as age 70. Those who wait to take the benefit until age 67 receive around 43% more monthly, and waiting until age 70 can lead to about a 75% increase in lifetime monthly benefits. But how can you get people to delay Social Security – and, potentially, enjoying their retirement? And would more Americans choosing to wait have an impact on insolvency problems facing Social Security? According to many estimates, Social Security will run out of money in the 2030s unless the government takes action.

New research from Olivia Mitchell, a Wharton professor of business economics and public policy, attempts to answer these questions. The paper, “Evaluating Lump Sum Incentives for Delayed Social Security Claiming,” was co-authored with Raimond Maurer, a finance professor at Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany. Mitchell, who also serves as director of Wharton’s Pension Research Council, recently appeared on the Knowledge@Wharton radio show on SiriusXM to discuss their findings.

An edited transcript of the conversation follows.

Olivia Mitchell: Social Security is one of the main sources of old-age support in America, and it is running short of money. Pretty soon, about a few years from now, we are going to have to raise Social Security taxes by one third, four percentage points at payroll, or cut benefits immediately by 25% for everyone, retirees and future retirees. So the solvency problem is real.

Knowledge@Wharton: What about the issue of people working longer? How much of an impact on Social Security could there be if people waited a few extra years to receive their benefits?

Mitchell: Well right now about 48% of all women claim as early as age 62, and about 42% of men claim that early. This is quite a concern, especially with regards to elderly poverty. If you only waited a few years, in fact if you waited all of the way until age 70, benefits would go up by 75%.

So it can make a huge difference to your cash flow in retirement. Now granted, not everybody can make it that long, but every year you delay, your benefits go up by 8%. You basically can’t earn that on assets without taking normal risk, whereas Social Security is for the future something I think we have to try to fix.

Knowledge@Wharton: Are people already working longer? We heard stories around the time of the Great Recession of retirement accounts being depleted and people having to keep working or go back to work.

“This lump sum could actually help people build their asset position, and let them enter retirement in much better shape.”

Mitchell: Well it is true that women, in particular, have been delaying claiming and working longer, but still if you look at the fraction of Americans working even until 67, it’s less than 10%. So there’s a lot of room for delayed claiming. One of the things we did in the paper was to try to investigate alternative ways to incentivize, to encourage people to delay claiming. Not to punish them by saying, “No you can’t retire,” but by giving them a carrot if they waited to retire.

Knowledge@Wharton: How did you test this?

Mitchell: We started with an experimental survey where we surveyed a nationally representative group of Americans, and we said to them, here is what we compute your Social Security benefit would be based on your earnings to date. When do you think you are going to claim? And they gave us a number, and then we said: What if instead we gave you the same benefit if you delay claiming, the same benefit you would have gotten at age 62, but instead of giving you a higher benefit per month we gave you the increment as a lump sum?

And it turns out these magnitudes are huge. So for example if you were 62, and you had determined that you were eligible for a $1500 a month benefit from Social Security, if you delayed claiming until age 67 you would get the same $1500 a month plus a $109,000 lump sum. If you delayed until age 72 you would get a $178,000 lump sum. This is some real money at this point.

The result we found in our survey is that people said they would delay claiming by one to two years, and they would work about half of that extra time. The consequence of this is that if you gave people the lump sums that we computed, Social Security would not suffer any additional solvency problems because they are computed to be actuarially fair. That is, they basically are equal to the expected value of the benefits you would have gotten, but those would have been doled out as monthly payments instead of as a lump sum. And people love lump sums.

Knowledge@Wharton: Why are lump sums so attractive to people?

Mitchell: One of the things that we have been finding in some other research is that Americans are more and more likely to hit retirement age carrying debt nowadays compared to say, 20 or 30 years ago. They are carrying mortgages, credit card debts, pay day loans, and so this lump sum could actually help people build their asset position, and let them enter retirement in much better shape.

Knowledge@Wharton: How would making this type of policy change impact Social Security as an institution moving forward?

“People today who are retired or nearing retirement should demand … that Congress focus on trying to fix the system before benefits run short.”

Mitchell: The answer to that question consisted of two parts. First, we said, let’s compute the lump sum so that there would be no net cost to Social Security. In other words, it wouldn’t improve it, but it wouldn’t make it any worse. The second thing we did was we built a model that tried to estimate how much less you might be able to give people in the lump sum and still get them to claim later, and potentially work a little bit more.

The only reason we went in that direction is because as we said at the outset there are huge shortfalls that the system is facing. What we learned is that if the lump sum were 13% lower, in other words if the lump sum were 87% of what the benefit should be, it would be actuarially fair, people would still delay claiming, and the system would save a little bit of money and people would be better off….

Knowledge@Wharton: Do you think more attention needs to be paid to fixing Social Security as a whole before we could even consider a plan like this?

Mitchell: I think we have to. Reforming Social Security certainly isn’t on Congress’s front page today; we know other things are. But the reality is that the tax cut made this fiscal situation much more dire, and pretty soon it is going to be very much upon us. People today who are retired or nearing retirement should demand … that Congress focus on trying to fix the system before benefits run short.

Knowledge@Wharton: Why is there such a difference in the claim ages of men and women?

Mitchell: When Social Security was established back in the 1930s, the typical family structure was the working male and the wife that stayed home with the kids — working as well, of course, but not for pay. And so the U.S. Social Security system has a heavy subsidy for women to stay home, because women, especially if they have working husbands, get half of their Social Security benefits even if they never work for pay at all.

So that is one reason that a lot of women claim early. Now that has been changing. Over time, as more women have spent additional years in the labor force, their own benefits grow to be a bigger portion of their retirement income. But the reality is still if you look back at history, the tradition has been to subsidize non-working women, or women not working for pay, and in fact to penalize working women.

“… The people who will delay claiming most [if they were promised a lump sum] are the people from our analysis … who would claim now at age 62.”

So both my husband and I pay Social Security taxes, but one of us won’t get any more for that because the benefits won’t be improved. What I would say is that if you look at this lump sum reform that we propose, it would actually increase cash income for people over the age of 62…. And I think most importantly it would increase the amount of assets older people have, especially low- and middle-income folks. Because right now, middle and low income folks essentially have no assets, or maybe they have a home but not much else.

Knowledge@Wharton: What are the other key takeaways from this research?

Mitchell: The thing that I found very interesting was that the people who will delay claiming most [if they were promised a lump sum] are the people from our analysis … who would claim now at age 62. In other words, those are the folks that would in fact work longer and claim later, because the incentive to them makes a very big difference.

So I think the takeaway that I came out with was that lump sum options can help the system. They will potentially benefit the macro economy because people continuing to work will be paying more taxes. They will definitely benefit people’s personal finances, especially at the middle and the bottom of the income distribution. And delayed [retirement] can actually be good for your mental and physical health.

So all of these features, I think, are factors that make this proposal potentially very, very positive when we get to reform.

Knowledge@Wharton: What’s next for this research?

Mitchell: I have talked to folks in Congress, and we hope that when and if Social Security comes back on the radar, this will be informative. I have also talked to people in China; they seem very interested about a lump sum alternative, which is seen as a reward, a set of incentives rather than a punishment, which is so often how Social Security reform is seen.

“The whole concept of people needing an income stream in retirement is something we have to reintroduce.”

Knowledge@Wharton: What do you think are some of the roadblocks to convincing legislators to implement a plan like this? Do you think the lump sum aspect would worry legislators because they think people might spend it quickly rather than saving it?

Mitchell: Well this is one reason that we continue to make the early retirement benefit payable when you defer claiming. In other words, one proposal, which we didn’t pursue, might have been to lump sum all of Social Security. But the concern then is somebody will go buy a boat or blow all of their money at the casino, or what have you. I think we have paid enough attention to maintaining a minimum poverty income in old age, that we need to keep some retirement income stream.

I think that the whole concept of people needing an income stream in retirement is something we have to reintroduce. In the old days, the original pension plan, the defined benefit plan, paid you a monthly paycheck, and that was what people lived on in retirement. Now that those traditional plans are pretty much gone with the exception of public-sector employees — and even then, they are in trouble — I think we need to go back and say, how much of our consumption can we finance by a lifetime annuity, an income stream if you will. And then how much do we have available to handle other needs and costs and desires in old age? And that discussion is something that I am really pushing.

 

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퇴직연금 TDF 성장의 배경

연금시장 2018. 9. 29. 20:26

최근 미국에서 가장 인기있는 투자전략인 TDF(target date funds)가 퇴직연금에서는 신통치 않을 수도 있다고 합니다.
미국의 한 조사기관(Investment Company Institute)에 의하면 미국 TDF에 보유된 자산은 2018년 3월말 1.1조 달러로 2005년 700억 달러에서 급성장하여 미국에서 가장 인기있는 투자전략이 되었습니다. 이 자산의 3분의 2는 DC퇴직연금에서 운용되고 있고, 퇴직연금사업자인 Vanguard의 조사에 따르면 DC가입자의 과반수가 한개의 TDF를 통해 자산운용하고 있습니다.
TDF는 퇴직연금 가입자가 예상한 은퇴시점에 적정소득을 창출하기 위해 주식 및 채권 자산을 자동으로 재조정하는 펀드인데, 은퇴시 일관된 소득을 제공하기에 어려울 수 있다는 비판이 나오고 있습니다.
미국 Princeton 대학과 Lionel Martellini교수 등 프랑스 Edhec 경영대학원의 교수들이 공동작업을 통해 TDF의 단점을 밝히고 개선하기 위한 목적으로 두가지 지표를 만들었습니다. (Edhec 경영대학원은 목표기반투자(Goals-based investing)에 매진하고 있는 Merrill Lynch Wealth Management의 지원을 받고 있습니다.)
그 지수 중 하나가 은퇴자가 은퇴후 1달러의 소득을 받기 위해 지불해야하는 비용(purchasing power)입니다. 올 상반기 성과에 따라 7월에 발표 된 자료에 따르면 2038년에서 2058년까지 20년간 매년 은퇴소득 1달러를 확보하기 위해 필요한 비용은 8.57달러입니다.
TDF의 가장 큰 단점은, 안전한 자산배분으로 간주하여 채권에 자산을 할당하는 행위가 위험할 수 있다는 점입니다. 채권이 소득을 제공할 지 몰라도 보장(guarantee)하지는 않는다는 겁니다. 채권은 연금상품과 유사하여 따박따박 현금 수입을 제공할 수 있지만, 유연성이 부족하다는 것입니다.
TDF의 채권 자산배분 비중 변화는 은퇴시 필요한 현금흐름에 대한 좋은 대용지표(proxy) 임에는 틀림없지만, 채권 포트폴리오가 시장 리스크에 민감한 단기 채권으로 구성되어 있고 은퇴자가 기대하고 있는 다른 소득에 대해서는 고려하고 있지 못하기 때문에 대체소득을 창출하는데는 실패할 수도 있습니다. 컨설팅 회사인 Target Date Solutions의 Ron Surz사장은 "단지 수익창출을 위해 TDF를 만들었던 회사들이 승자가 될 뿐이다"라고 말합니다.
미국은 DC가입자가 적립금운용방법을 선택하지 않을 경우 DC사업자는 가입자의 자산을 자동배분하는 Default fund를 제공하도록 2006년부터 법제화되어 있고, 이 법은 TDF의 목록을 포함해서 어떤 종류로 배분하는 것이 적정한지를 정하고 있습니다.
TDF의 급성장은 이런 법적 장치 덕분이고, TDF의 결함에도 불구하고 재무설계사와 연금 감독자가 TDF에 의존할 수 밖에 없는 것도 이 법때문이다라고 Surz는 말했습니다.
하지만 UBS의 Sandy Cunningham는 재무설계사들이 퇴직연금 가입자와 함께 고유 목표에 기반하여 재무설계하고 적절한 투자 전략을 정해야한다고 조언했습니다. 물론 결국 TDF의 구조처럼 주식위주 포트폴리오를 채권으로 변화시키겠지만, "DC가입자들은 처음 가입해서 주식에 더 높은 배분을 원하며 이는 연금자산을 더 빨리 키울 수 있는 최고의 기회를 제공 할 수 있을 것이다"라고 덧붙였습다.

 

출처 : https://www.ft.com/content/e5cf9c6e-9a24-11e8-88de-49c908b1f264?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754ec6

Target date funds risk missing the mark for retirees

Academics argue that retirement investors are facing unforeseen risks

 

  Richard Henderson
  
   One of the most popular investment strategies employed in US retirement accounts is ill-suited for the job, according to research on retirement outcomes. These strategies, known as target date funds, automatically rebalance equity and bond assets over time with the aim of reaching an adequate allocation of income-producing investments by a saver’s expected retirement date.Their rise has been meteoric. Assets held in US target date mutual funds now stand at $1.1tn, compared with $70bn in 2005, according to first-quarter data compiled by the Investment Company Institute, a trade body. Two-thirds of such assets are held via defined contribution pension schemes. According to Vanguard, the $5.1tn asset manager and pension provider, half of its DC savers in the US hold their assets in a single target date fund. But academics suggest such products may struggle to deliver a consistent stream of income for retirees. A group of professors at Princeton University and French business school Edhec have joined forces to create two types of indices that explore the effectiveness of target date funds, in a bid to identify their shortcomings and suggest tweaks.The group’s work builds on that of the Edhec Risk Institute research unit, supported by Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, a proponent of “goals-based investing”, an alternative to target date funds.One index series aims to show the purchasing power retirees can expect by showing the price of generating one dollar of retirement income. Data released in July, spanning the performance of the index in the first six months of the year, show it will cost $8.57 to secure $1 of replacement income every year of retirement from 2038 to 2058.This underscores the importance of crafting investment products that generate sustained income for retirees, says Lionel Martellini, a professor at Edhec currently seconded to Princeton. He chairs the research unit that developed the indices.

Prof Martellini says the key shortcoming with target date funds the group has identified is the fact that the bond allocation, intended to be the safe portion of the portfolio, is often risky. This risk hinges on the fact that bond portfolios offer — but do not guarantee — income, according to the researchers.The fixed income allocation should look more like an annuity, Prof Martellini says, a financial product that pays a steady stream of income to the holder. But it must avoid the pitfalls of annuities, namely a lack of flexibility that means they cannot be passed on to a next of kin, for example.“That’s what we’re talking about — a bond portfolio that is a good proxy for the cash flow that people need. Such a simple move will add a large benefit to how much replacement income you can generate,” Prof Martellini says. Critics say target date funds fail to achieve this because their fixed income portfolios are composed of short-term bonds that are beholden to market risks and do not take into account retirees’ different income expectations.Others stress it is early days. “The overall idea of target date funds is good, but in terms of their metamorphosis they’re in the larvae stage — they’re ugly and scary and that needs to change,” says Ron Surz, president of consultancy Target Date Solutions and author of the Fiduciary Handbook for Understanding and Selecting Target Date Funds. “Fund companies have designed these to make a profit — they are the winners,” he says, while investors often lose out.A 2006 law required DC providers to offer a default fund into which individuals are automatically assigned if they do not choose their underlying investments. The law defined which types of strategies would be suitable: a list that included target date funds.This led to sharp asset growth but has also prompted financial advisers and those overseeing these pensions to rely on them despite their flaws, says Mr Surz. “Their motives are to not get sued,” he adds.Sandy Cunningham, a UBS adviser on this year’s FT 401 list, says advisers should work with clients to create a financial plan based on their unique goals, and then decide on an appropriate investment strategy. Still, the end goal requires a structural shift from equities dominating the portfolio to bonds, says Ms Cunningham — in effect the structure of a target date fund. “When you first join, you want a higher allocation to equities, which can provide the best opportunity to build a retirement fund faster.”

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퇴직연금 재정부족 심각

연금시장 2018. 9. 28. 23:17

퇴직연금과 은퇴자 건강보험에 대한 적립부담을 고려할 때 미국 40개 주정부가 예산 집행에 필요한 재원이 부족하다고 합니다. 비영리 정부 감시단체인 Truth in Accounting (TIA)의 발표인데, 2017회계년도의 50개 주의 comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs)를 분석한 결과라고 하고, 주정부의 선출직 공무원들이 이런 비용들을 숨기는 통에 미래의 납세자들의 부담이 커질 것이라는 우려도 이야기합니다.

주정부 퇴직연금의 자산이 7%증가하는 통에 연기금 부족분은 다소 감소했지만, 은퇴자에 대한 건강보험에 필요한 부담 증가가 이 감소분 보다 더 많다는 분석입니다.
적립 부족액은 약 8천375억달러(약935조원)일 거라고 합니다.

 

출처 : https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2018/09/24/fortyusstatescannotaffordtopayalloftheirbills/#27a1ddcb718a

 

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Forty U.S. States Cannot Afford To Pay All Their Bills

 

Forty states do not have enough money to pay all of their bills, according to quantitative analysis in Financial State of the States, the ninth annual report published this evening by Truth in Accounting (TIA). TIA is a non-partisan, not-for-profit government finances watchdog. To balance the budget, “elected officials have not included the true costs of the government in their budget calculations and have pushed costs onto future taxpayers.” TIA’s comprehensive analysis of the fiscal health of all 50 states is based on the states’ fiscal year 2017 comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs).

“With the robust growth in the economy, you would have expected a big improvement in state finances” stated TIA CEO Sheila Weinberg.  “Unfortunately, that is not the case. State finances still deteriorated. While unfunded pension liabilities slightly decreased due to a 7% increase in the value of pension assets, this decrease was more than offset by an increase in unfunded retiree health care benefits.”

Truth in Accounting, CEO Sheila WeinbergTIA

 

TIA’s analysis found that because government financial statements do not report all liabilities of a state, elected officials and citizens are making financial decisions without knowing the true financial condition of their government. A major challenge for investors is the lack of transparency and accuracy in a lot of government accounting. This makes it difficult for even experienced analysts of government financial documents and municipal bond investors to understand and evaluate a public-sector entity’s true financial health.

The total unfunded debt among the 50 states increased by $53.4 billion to more than $1.5 trillion in fiscal year 2017. Most of this debt comes from unfunded retiree benefit promises, such as pension and retiree healthcare debt. TIA’s analysis found that unfortunately “one of the ways states make their budgets look balanced is by shortchanging public pension funds. This practice has resulted in a $837.5 billion shortfall.” Other post-employment benefits, mainly retiree healthcare liabilities, totaled $663.1 billion.

 

Taxpayers in forty states are on the hook for their states' shortfalls.Truth in Accounting

TIA has a grading system for the states to give greater context to each state’s Taxpayer Burden or Taxpayer Surplus. To arrive at a taxpayer’s burden or surplus, you divide the state’s shortfall or surplus by the number of a state’s taxpayers.

  • A grade: Taxpayer Surplus greater than $10,000 (3 states).
  • B grade: Taxpayer Surplus between $100 and $10,000 (7 states).
  • C grade: Taxpayer Burden between $0 and $4,900 (12 states).
  • D grade: Taxpayer Burden between $5,000 and $20,000 (18 states).
  • F grade: Taxpayer Burden greater than $20,000 (10 states).

Only 6% of states have a grade of A, while 56% of states received a near failing grade of D or the failing grade F.TIA

States with a surplus are Alaska, North Dakota, Wyoming, Utah and South Dakota. Alaska is the state in the best financial condition, because it can pay all of its bills and has a surplus of $56,000 for each taxpayer in Alaska.  However, there is room for improvement, Alaska is not fully transparent with taxpayers. “None of its other post-employment benefits are reported in the financial statements.”  Given the level of energy resources that Alaska has, this surplus is not surprising. However, if energy prices were to decline significantly, that surplus would be at risk.

Sunshine states leave taxpayers with a surplus.TIA

The state in the worst financial shape is New Jersey.  It only has $25.5 billion available in assets to pay $221 billion worth of bills. This $195.5 billion shortfall means that each New Jersey taxpayer is on the hook for $61,400.  The state did report all of its pension debt, but according to TIA the state “continues to hide $34.3 billion of its retiree health care debt.  Moreover, New Jersey’s net position is “inflated by $27.7 billion, largely because the state defers recognizing losses incurred when the net pension liability increases.”  Other states that are leaving their taxpayers with significant tax burdens include Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Hawaii, Delaware, California, New York, and Vermont.

Sinkhole states leave taxpayers with a significant tax burden.TIA

A new financial reporting rule taking effect for the 2018 fiscal year will require states to report all unfunded other post-employment benefits (OPEB), particularly retiree health care liabilities, on their balance sheet.  In FY 2017, total unfunded OPEB liabilities among the 50 states was $663.1 billion. Two-thirds of that, or $439.5 billion, however, was not reported on states’ balance sheets. Essentially this is “hidden debt.”   

These states have the largest difference in reported vs. total unfunded retiree health care promises, or hidden debt.TIA

In addition to analyzing states’ finances, TIA has also analyzed the financial condition of the most populated cities in the U.S. two years in a row. 64 out of the 75  most populated cities do not have enough money to pay all of their bills. These cities have racked up $335.4 billion in unfunded municipal debt. TIA found Irvine and Stockton, California to be in the best financial shape and New York and Chicago to be in the worst shape. The next update to the Financial State of the Cities is planned for January 2019.

Recently, TIA has also started branching out to analyze the state of finances of other municipalities. This September, TIA gave Westchester County and the Village of Scarsdale, both in New York state, a near-failing grade of ‘D.’  TIA’s analysis found that “Westchester County's elected officials have made repeated financial decisions that have left the county with a debt burden of $2.8 billion, according to the analysis. That burden equates to $8,400 for every local taxpayer. Westchester County's financial problems stem mostly from unfunded retirement obligations that have accumulated over many years. Of the $5.8 billion in retirement benefits promised, the county has not funded $173.5 million in pension and $2.5 billion in retiree health care benefits.” According to the report about the Village of Scarsdale, its “financial condition is not only disconcerting, but also misleading as government officials have failed to disclose significant amounts of retirement debt on the village’s balance sheet. As a result, residents and taxpayers have been presented with an inaccurate and untruthful accounting of their government’s finances.”

In order to provide more transparency and accountability in the budgeting process, TIA recommends that municipalities use Full Accrual Calculations and Techniques (FACT) based budgeting.  The purpose of FACT is to get states and municipalities to move beyond cash-based methods to include accrual of all expenses.  This would provide a “full-cost” and more truthful basis for budgeting. According to Weinberg, TIA is also currently working “to improve the Financial Reporting Model for state and local governments, so governments would be required to report their general and other governmental funds' balance sheets and income statements using a full accrual basis.”

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