양적완화(quantitative easing)라고 하는 것은 은행이 돈을 빌려주는 조건을 쉽게 만드는 것이다. 즉 사람들이 싼 이자를 내고도 장기든 단기든 돈을 빌릴 수 있게 하는 것이다. (많이 빌릴 수록 많이 소비하니까...)

그러나, 돈을 빌려 쓰려는 사람에게는 희소식이지만 예금 이자에 의존하는 사람에게는 그렇치 않을 수 있다.

은행이 원래 예금자에게 주려고 했던 금리(“natural” interest rate)가 4%인데 이런 정책으로 1%로 줄었다면, 결국 정상적으로 받아야할 3%를 양적완화 때문에 잃은 것이다. 세전 4% 이자소득이 있었지만 정부에게 3%를 떼준 셈이라 이건 세금이나 마찬가지이다.

결국 예금소득자에게 양적완화는 증세와 같은 것인데, 정부는 조세저항을 유발하는 세금이라는 말을 쓰는 대신에 양적완화라고 할 뿐이다.

물론 투자자에게는 저금리가 유리하다.

그러나 투자자와 달리 예금이자 소득에 의존하여 먹고 사는 사람, 단기 금리에 영향을 많이 받는 사람의 경우, 매우 불리하다.

한편, 은퇴한 노령자의 경우 리스크 회피성향이 높고 짧은 여명으로 장기투자가 어렵기 때문에 투자자가 아니라 예금자가 되게된다.

출처 : www.ft.com/content/6fa8908a-7fca-40c4-9c5a-e6ac86b12504?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754ec6&fbclid=IwAR3K2XRglpOgv8z-pKm6U9vILyZZ-RSJHErsi0F-EdiVbkUP1fBUSxtcZ4I

Low interest rates are a tax on savers

Central bankers cannot find a way to help borrowers without hurting savers

Don Ezra June 24 2020

You may have noticed that interest rates (be they bank interest rates, yields on bonds or whatever) are very low. They have been very low for a long time. Interest rates in some countries have even gone negative, whatever that means.

There are logical explanations that economists offer. I understand them. But to me, low interest rates are just like a tax on my savings income. Let me tell you why. And you don’t need to understand economics to get my point.

In the countries I’m thinking of, the central bank sets an interest rate. This is the rate that banks (where you and I deposit money) pay when they borrow from the central bank. Many other interest rates depend on the level of this central bank rate. What that does is to make all short-term interest rates lower, when the central bank reduces its declared rate.

Central banks also do something called “quantitative easing” — a jargon phrase, if ever there was one. Never mind “quantitative” — that just describes the technical method — it’s the easing of borrowing conditions, not just short-term but also long-term, that’s the goal.

A natural consequence of the central bank’s moves is that borrowing money becomes cheaper. And if governments and people can borrow money more cheaply, they’re more likely to do so, and that in turn gives them more money to spend.

So that’s what central banks have in mind: they’re trying to stimulate spending in the economy, and keep the economy growing if it might otherwise look like it’s slowing down.

It’s a good cause, so it’s good news, right? For borrowers, yes. But not for savers!

Suppose the “natural” interest rate that a bank would offer on your savings deposits — the rate that would apply if the central bank weren’t deliberately lowering rates — is 4 per cent. And suppose the actual rate is 1 per cent. You’re losing 3 per cent that you would have been given if interest rates weren’t artificially forced down.

To me, that’s just like a tax. It’s like an increase in income tax rates.

It has the same effect on your after-tax income as paying you 4 per cent, then taxing you at 100 per cent on the first 3 per cent and at your normal tax rates on the remaining 1 per cent. It’s like: “Give the first 3 per cent back to the government.”

So I don’t think of “quantitative easing” as anything but a tax increase compared with normal economic conditions. But of course it’s much more acceptable if the hated word “tax” can be avoided, and even better if a jargon phrase is used instead, because there’s no chance the public will get it.

Another consequence of lower interest rates is that it becomes more attractive to invest money in enterprises that seek growth. Partly this is because the enterprises find it cheaper than before to borrow, so their after-borrowing profits should rise. And partly because their future profits are worth more today, if you’re discounting them at lower interest rates.

So investors are also favoured by lower interest rates. And therefore they’re more inclined to invest. (Did you notice how stock markets and property values soared, as interest rates fell over the past decade, before the pandemic?)

By the way, economists often don’t distinguish between savers and investors. I do. To me, an investor is someone who seeks long-term growth and can afford to take the shorter-term risks that inevitably accompany growth-seeking investments. A saver is someone who can’t afford to lose money; for them, short-term certainty is more important, so anything that could go down in the near future is avoided.

Overall, therefore, lower interest rates are good for investors and bad for savers.

As I’ve said, the cost of the stimulus is borne, at least in part, by savers, who get paid less. The old, the poor and the financially illiterate are the most vulnerable — those who can’t afford to lose money, or don’t have the time, sophistication or resources to avoid the obstacles placed in their path. I specifically include people in retirement here, because their planning time horizon shortens as they age; this makes them more risk-averse, so they’re much more likely to be savers than investors.

It’s not that central bankers actively dislike savers. They just can’t find a way to help borrowers without hurting savers. Their tools are very blunt instruments, as they acknowledge.

The cost of stimulus is also borne by future taxpayers, because the increase in debt that results from whatever increase goes on to the government’s balance sheet must be repaid some day. Maybe it’ll be through new borrowing to repay the old loans, or maybe it’ll be through explicitly higher future taxes. But one way or another, the can gets kicked down the road, and future generations will inherit worse conditions than they otherwise would — so that the current generation can benefit.

Yes, I know I’m oversimplifying. But that’s only in the details that I’ve skipped over, for ease of explanation. The basic analysis is accurate. Artificially lowered interest rates are used as an economic stimulus, to raise spending and investment. The immediate cost is borne by savers, for whom it’s akin to an immediate tax increase.

Don Ezra is the former co-chairman of global consulting for Russell Investments worldwide, and the author of “Life Two: how to get to and enjoy what used to be called retirement”

영국의 100대 기업중 절반 이상이 10년 안에 기업의 DB자산에서 퇴직자에게 지급하던 연금을 외부로 이전(Pension Buy-out)할 것으로 예상된다.

우리나라를 제외한 대다수 국가에서 DB제도는 근로자가 퇴직시에도 국민연금처럼 기업이 종신연금을 퇴직자에게 주는 제도이다.
그러나 영국의 경우 2009년부터 2018년 까지 기간동안 세전이익이 57조파운드에서 134조파운드로 두배 넘게 늘어났지만 DB에 투입하는 보충부담금은 감소한 것으로 나타났다.

기업이 발생한 이익을 어떻게 배분하느냐에 따라 주주배당과 연기금 보충부담금이 결정되는데, 이러한 추세는 당분간 계속될 것으로 보인다.
기업이 장수리스크를 헷지 등을 위해 이런 의사결정을 하고 있는 것으로 보이는데, 영국의 감독원(TPR)은 이러한 추세를 예의주시하고 있다.

출처 : https://www.theactuary.com/news/2019/06/half-of-ftse-100-db-pension-schemes-could-buyout-by-2028/?fbclid=IwAR13194peih6yysXoRvbrFZWmMxuZb_OQoLMi-7rJnnrXICv76MLHZhnsXo

Half of FTSE 100 DB pension schemes could buyout by 2028

More than half of the UK’s 100 largest listed companies will be able to buyout their defined benefit (DB) pension scheme within 10 years, research by Barnett Waddingham has found.

01 JULY 2019 | CHRIS SEEKINGS

DB deficit contributions fall as profits rise ©Shutterstock

The consultancy firm estimates that 20% of FTSE 100 companies will be in a position to buyout their DB scheme within five years, and that 55% will be by 2028.

This comes after post-tax profits for these firms more than doubled from £57bn to £134bn between 2009 and 2018. However, DB deficit contributions fell during that time.

Barnett Waddingham said that diverting an extra 6% of profits into companies’ pensions would allow 70% of FTSE 100 DB schemes to buyout within the next 10 years.

“The DB endgame is increasingly a realistic short-term focus for many companies, and the dividend versus deficit contribution balance is a key lever,” partner, Nick Griggs, said.

The findings show that payments to shareholders increased by 171% to £120bn between 2009 and 2018, while contributions to DB schemes fell 10% to £8.3bn per year.

However, the researchers estimated that doubling annual pension contributions to £16.6bn would allow 30% of FTSE 100 firms to buyout their DB liabilities within five years.

And if current deficit contributions increased by five times, then 60% of FTSE 100 schemes would be in a position to buyout in the next five years.

Barnett Waddingham said that companies would still pay out three times as much to shareholders as they do to pension schemes by taking this more radical approach.

But it warned that political instability and economic uncertainty could disrupt pension deficits, and that The Pensions Regulator (TPR) is likely to be increasingly interventionist.

“Having a robust, coherent plan in place for the DB endgame journey will be the best defence against any intervention from TPR as it will take comfort from the framework that has been put in place,” Griggs added.